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NOTES
APPLICABILITY OF THE SALES TAX TO
PARTICULAR TRANSACTIONS
The rapid spread of sales tax legislation within the past three
or four years, is evidenced by its adoption to date by well over
half the states of our nation.2 In comparison with other forms
of state taxation the revenue-raising powers of the sales tax
are almost phenomenal. For example, in 1937 the State of
Missouri derived almost 50 per cent of its revenue from that
one channel alone. Whenever a tax assumes such extensive pro-
portions it is not unusual to find an avalanche of litigation con-
testing the applicability of the tax to specific situations. 3 The
resulting opinions in this instance have been typical of those
usually rendered during the embryonic period of development
of a new phase of law: conflicting, shallow, pragmatic, and irrec-
oncilable. It is the purpose of this Note to assemble and cor-
relate these decisions by a discussion of three principal methods
by which the inapplicability of the sales tax to a particular
transaction may be asserted.
1. IS THERE A "SALE" OF "TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY"?
A "sale at retail" is typically defined in the Missouri Sales
Tax Law as any transfer of "the ownership of or title to, tangi-
ble personal property to the purchaser, for use or consumption,
and not for resale in any form as tangible personal property for
a valuable consideration."' Reasoning from such a definition,
1. Although there were a few scattered instances of sales taxes enacted
prior to 1934, that year may well be said to mark the modern and substan-
tial development of sales taxation. See Status of State General Sales Taxes
as of July 1, 1937 (1937) 15 Tax Mag. 541.
2. Sales taxes exist in slightly varying forms in the following states:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California (Retail Sales and Use), Colorado
(Retail Sale, Use, and Service), Connecticut (Gross Receipts), Delaware
(Receipts and Purchases), Illinois (Retailers' Occupational and Public Util-
ity), Indiana (Gross Income), Iowa (Retail Sales and Use), Kansas (Re-
tail Sales and Compensating), Louisiana, Maryland (Stock in Trade),
Michigan (General Sales and Use), Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota (Receipts), Ohio (Retail Sales and Use),
Oklahoma (Retail Sales and Use), Pennsylvania (Mercantile License Tax
on Sales), South Dakota, Utah (Retail Sales and Use), Virginia, Washing-
ton (Retail Sales, Business and Occupation, and Compensating), West Vir-
ginia (Retail Sales and Business and Occupation), and Wyoming (Retail
Sale and Use). The District of Columbia also has a sales tax, and New
York City has Retail Sales, Gross Receipts, Public Utility Excise, and Spe-
cial Personal Property Taxes. For specific reference to these statutes see
Prentice-Hall State & Local Tax Service; and for a brief r~sum6 see
Status of State General Sales Taxes (1937) 15 Tax Mag. 541 ff.
3. It is not within the scope of this Note to consider the many cases
which involved the constitutionality of the sales taxes.
4. Mo. Laws, 1937, p. 556; 12 Mo. Stat. Ann. secs. 10164b-1(g).
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the applicability of the tax has often been questioned by an
allegation that the transaction sought to be taxed did not con-
stitute a sale or transfer of ownership in tangible personal
property.
According to the unadulterated law of Sales a sale is an agree-
ment whereby the seller transfers the property in goods to the
buyer for a consideration. 5 A distinction is drawn between a
sale of goods and a furnishing of service., This distinction lies
at the basis of many of the sales tax cases. The problem is best
approached by a factual analysis of the specific types of cases in
which this issue has been raised.
Restaurants-There is a conflict among the courts as to
whether serving food and drink to customers in a restaurant
constitutes a sale.7 Many jurisdictions maintain that it is not a
sale and therefore hold that a customer can not sue the pro-
prietor on the theory of implied warranty.8 The Uniform Sales
Act, in effect in approximately two-thirds of the states, is silent
on the matter.9 Although the Supreme Court of Alabama has
refused to recognize the transaction as a sale for warranty
purposes,10 it has held it subject to the sales tax." The court
admitted that it was applying varying meanings according to
the circumstances but held that the manifest purpose of the tax
should not be defeated by narrow constructions based on nice
distinctions in the meaning of words. 2 The Appellate Court of
Illinois, however, had already decided that the serving of a
meal by a restaurateur to a patron constitutes a sale.1 It was
not, therefore, unusual for the Illinois court to hold that such
a transaction was taxable. 4 Both the Alabama and the Illinois
decisions would seem to be reasonable in the light of the pur-
pose of the sales tax, but the Alabama decision serves to illus-
5. Vold, Law of Sales (1931) 5.
6. 23 R. C. L., Sales (1919) 1221, sec. 38, and cases cited.
7. 1 Uniform Laws Annotated (1931) 117; 55 C. J., Sales (1931) 45,
sec. 8, and cases cited. The cases are also listed in Brevoort Hotel Co. v.
Ames (1935) 360 Ill. 485, 196 N. E. 461.
8. 1 Williston, Sales (2d. ed. 1924) 485, see. 242b. See also 55 C. J.,
Sales (1931) 767, sec. 733, and cases cited.
9. 1 Uniform Laws Annotated (1931) 103, 117.
10. McCarley v. Wood Drugs (1934) 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446; Hooper
Cafe Co. v. Henderson (1931) 223 Ala. 579, 137 So. 419.
11. Pappanastos v. State Tax Commission (Ala. 1937) 177 So. 158.
12. Id. at 159.
13. Greenwood v. John R. Thompson Co. (1919) 213 Ill. App. 371. This
holding was, however, contrary to the Illinois Supreme Court holding in
Sheffer v. Willoughby (1896) 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. E. 253.
14. Brevoort Hotel Co. v. Ames (1935) 360 Ill. 485, 196 N. E. 461;
O'Neil v. Dept. of Finance (1935) 360 Ill. 484, 19G N. E. 463.
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trate the negligible value of analogies in deciding the sales tax
cases. It is interesting to speculate as to the effect of these sales
tax decisions on the use of the doctrine of implied warranty in
restaurant cases.
Printing, Engraving, Photography, etc. - The courts are
sharply divided as to the applicability of the sales tax to this type
of business. 5 The New York courts, on the one hand, have upheld
the tax on a transfer of a photo-engraving although the value
of the metal in the finished product was only two per cent of
the price paid by the purchaser.16 The reasoning of such courts
seems to be entirely negative in character, namely, that if such
a transfer were not taxed, many other articles, the chief value
of which arises from the service expended in their manufacture,
would escape the tax. 7
On the other hand, it is asserted that the manufacturers of
these products are not engaged in the sale of goods but in the
business of furnishing skill and labor and the use of machin-
ery.18 The materials used in making the finished product are
said to be merely incidental to the business.'9 The Illinois Su-
preme Court, for example, drew analogies between the paper
on which a photostatic copy is made or a blue print produced
and the paper on which a lawyer writes a will or deed or the
abstractor shows a chain of title. M' The Illinois view would
appear to be more rational than that of New York. It is inter-
esting, however, to speculate as to where and how the Illinois
courts will draw the line of demarcation-will they permit the
taxation of so-called sales of paintings, pottery, tailored clothing,
Swiss watches and the like? Undoubtedly many such items are
sold subject to the tax. The courts have thus far formulated
15. Transaction held taxable: People ex rel. Walker Engraving Corp. v.
Graves (1935) 243 App. Div. 652, 276 N. Y. S. 674, aff'd 268 N. Y. 648,
198 N. E. 539 (photo engraving); People ex rel. Foremost Studio, Inc. v.
Graves (1936) 246 App. Div. 130, 284 N. Y. S. 906 (designs); Long v.
Roberts & Son (Ala. 1937) 176 So. 213 (printing, lithographing, engrav-
ing, steel dye embossing, bookbinding); Cusick v. Commonwealth (1935)
260 Ky. 204, 84 S. W. (2d) 14 (photographs).
Transaction held not taxable: Washington Printing & Binding Co. v.
State (Wash. 1937) 73 P. (2d) 1326 (printing); A. B. C. Electrotype Co. v.
Ames (1936) 364 Ill. 360, 4 N. E. (2d) 476 (electrotypes); H. G. Adair
Printing Co. v. Ames (1936) 364 Ill. 342, 4 N. E. (2d) 481 (printing);
JT. A. Burgess Co. v. Ames (1935) 359 Ill. 427, 194 N. E. 565 (blue-printing,
photostating, photography).
16. People ex rel. Walker Engraving Corp. v. Graves, supra, note 15.
17. Cusick v. Commonwealth, supra, note 15.
18. See cases cited in second portion of note 15, supra.
19. Ibid.
19a. J. A. Burgess Co. v. Ames (1935) 359 Ill. 427, 194 N. E. 565, 566.
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no significant tests or standards by which to determine the
applicability of the tax. It has been suggested that a workable
test might be to ascertain whether the purchaser intended to
purchase the goods for their own intrinsic value, or to contract
for the rendition of a certain service without any particular
desire to acquire personal property. This realistic approach
would seem to provide a useful formula for the sales tax cases.
Optometry-In 1937 the Supreme Court of Alabama decided
that the sales tax could be validly applied to the "sale" of
glasses by an optometrist. 20 The court rejected the test of the
relative value of material and service (used by the Illinois court
in the blue-printing case), and adopted the test of "the nature
and character of the process, activities, or manufacture required
or employed.11201 The court's failure to explain or clarify its
vague language is unfortunate.
Later in 1937 the Illinois Supreme Court held that such a
"sale" was not taxable.21 The court stressed the fact that the
Illinois Legislature had previously recognized "optometry" as
a profession rather than a calling or a trade.22 The furnishing
of lenses and frames was said to be merely incidental to the
personal service rendered by the professional optometrist. The
court appropriately compared the case with the furnishing of
medicine or surgical dressing by a physician and of inlays,
crowns, and false teeth by a dentist.221
License to Use-The peculiar wording of the New York City
Sales Tax requires brief mention in passing. The statute ex-
pressly defines "sale" to include "license to use."23 This of course
constitutes a new twist to the orthodox conception of a true sale.
Thus the licensing of motion picture films for exhibition has
been held to be a taxable sale pursuant to such a definition. 24
But the New York Court of Appeals has refused to extend the
meaning to include the assignment by an artist of the right to
reproduce certain of his paintings. 25 The court held that the
possessory interest given was merely incidental, inasmuch as
the right to use and sell the exhibit was retained by the artist.
20. State Tax Commission v. Hopkins (Ala. 1937) 176 So. 210.
20a. Id. at 213.
21. Babcock v. Nudelman (Ill. 1937) 12 N. E. (2d) 635.
22. Id. at 636.
22a. Id. at 637.
23. New York City, Local Laws, 1934, no. 24, published as no. 25, p. 165,
sec. 1 (e).
24. United Artists Corp. v. Taylor (1936) 248 App. Div. 207, 288 N. Y. S.
946, aff'd (1937) 273 N. Y. 334, 7 N. E. (2d) 254.
25. Howitt v. Street & Smith Publications, Inc. (1938) 276 N. Y. 345, 12
N. E. (2d) 435, rev'g (1937) 251 App. Div. 461, 297 N. Y. S. 3.
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It attempted to reconcile this case with the motion picture case
on the ground that in the latter case the possessory interest was
granted for a certain length of time. Such reasoning appears
to be specious. It would seem that the New York court is try-
ing to restrict the scope of the term "license to use."
Miscellaneous-There are other scattered instances in which
the legal character of the transaction has been questioned.
The furnishing of financial reports by Dun & Bradstreet, for
example, has recently been held not taxable.2 6 The court here
held that the paper was a mere incident to the purchase of
skilled service. The planting of nursery stock on a customer's
land in performing a landscaping contract was held taxable
as an instance in which "the service is a mere incident to the
sale of the goods.12 7 Automobile repair shop proprietors were
likewise held to account for the payment of the tax on the
"sale" of auto parts used in the repair of another person's
automobile.28 The court pointed out that it was the custom of
the business to charge for parts and accessories at a stated price
separate from the charge for service. On the other hand it
refused to extend the tax to include the value of paints, lubri-
cants and minor supplies furnished as an incident to and as a
part of the service.2 9 The court's approach appears to be purely
factual and pragmatic.
Although from a strictly technical viewpoint it would seem
to be an erroneous application of the tax to extend it to condi-
tional sales, it would appear to be the only practical solution.
From a logical standpoint, however, one would expect to find a
credit allowed on the recapture of conditionally sold property.
26. Dun & Bradstreet v. City of New York (1937) 276 N. Y. 198, 11
N. E. (2d) 728, rev'g (1937) 251 App. Div. 25, 295 N. Y. S. 851. In this
case the corporation delivered reference books to its subscribers without
charge apart from the charge for services. The company retained title to
the books, forbade their use by others than subscribers, and warned its
subscribers not to rely on the books, but to consult reports in the possession
of the company. The court held that the subscribers did not pay for the
paper on which the information was conveyed or for the reference books,
but rather for the service rendered in giving such information. The court
likened the case to that of a telephone book and its relation to the service
rendered by the telephone company.
27. Swain Nelson & Sons Co. v. Dept. of Finance (1937) 365 Ill. 401, 6
N. E. (2d) 632. The Illinois Court declared that trees and shrubs, being
grown for purpose of sale, become personalty by severance from the land and
by virtue of statute. (Ill. Smith-Hurd Stats. (1935) ch. 120, sec. 12). This
is in accord with the law of Property. See Walsh, The Law of Property (2d
ed. 1934) secs. 15 and 16.
28. Doby v. State Tax Commission (Ala. 1937) 174 So. 233.
29. Id. at 236.
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But the Michigan courts, probably out of consideration for ad-
ministrative expediency, have ruled otherwise. 30
2. IS THE SALE "AT RETAIL"?
Sales taxes are ordinarily restricted to retail sales or transfers
to purchasers "for use and consumption and not for resale in
any form."' 31 Whether or not a given sale is "at retail" has
given rise to some "nice" questions.
Although the standard non-legal use of the word "retail"
connotes a sale in small quantities,32 the cases are practically
unanimous in holding that the quantity of goods sold is immate-
rial in determining whether or not a sale is at retail."3 The
Maryland court is alone in its position that the tax is inapplica-
ble when the sale involves large quantities. 4
It is not unusual to find a wholesaler, manufacturer, or pro-
ducer also engaged in retailing. The latter phase of that per-
son's activity is taxable provided that the retail sales are not
merely occasional but are sufficiently important to constitute
a business and occupation.35 Moreover, the sales tax is not
limited to persons whose only business is keeping a store and
disposing of property at a given location.31 Nor does it make
any difference how the vendor acquired title to the property,
or who has produced it.37
The most vexing problem in this connection is that of de-
termining whether the vendee is in fact the user and consumer
of the property sold. On this question generalizations are scarce
30. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. State Board of Tax Administration (1937)
281 Mich. 558, 275 N. W. 248; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fry (1936)
277 Mich. 260, 269 N. W. 166, 170.
31. The Missouri and Illinois statutes are typical: Mo. Laws, 1937, p.
556; 12 Mo. Stat. Ann. secs. 10164b-l(g); Ill. Smith-Hurd Stats. (1935)
ch. 120, sec. 440.
32. Webster, Intenmational Dictionary (1925) 1819.
33. See Wiseman v. Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n (1936) 192 Ark.
313, 90 S. W. (2d) 987; Herlihy Mid-Continent Co. v. Nudelman (Ill. 1937)
12 N. E. (2d) 638; Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames (1935) 359 Ill. 178,
194 N. E. 268.
34. Buck Glass Co. v. Gordy (Md. 1936) 185 Atl. 887. The court held
that a sale to a consumer "is ordinarily retail selling, but not always; and
sellers to consumers in the larger gross quantities are not within the regular
meaning of the word retailers" (I. c. 888). The court held that the common
acceptance of the word should control. Although the position of the Mary-
land court is logically correct, it would seem to be a limitation on the ap-
plication of the sales tax which the legislature never intended.
35. Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames (1935) 359 Ill. 178, 194 N. E.
268 (sale by coal mine operator); State v. Louisiana Baking Corp. (La.
1934) 153 So. 41; Buck Glass Co. v. Gordy, supra, note 34.
36. Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, supra, note 35.
37. See 194 N. E. at 270.
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as well as misleading. The safest and more valuable approach
is via a factual consideration of the individual cases.
Plumbing and heating contractors-The decisions are in con-
flict as to the whether the contractor who buys and installs
plumbing and heating equipment is the user and consumer of
such materials. One line of cases holds that the contractor is
the consumer and that there is no resale of the equipment by
him within the meaning of the sales tax.38 In the view of these
courts the sale from the manufacturer to the contractor is there-
fore the taxable transaction.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has defined "use and
consumption" as "a long-continued use and employment of a
thing to the purposes for which it was adapted as distinguished
from a possession and employment that are merely temporary
or occasional."' 9 It follows that the person who uses the plumb-
ing and heating materials on his property is the ultimate user
under the Illinois definition, and that the sale of the supplies to
the contractor is not a taxable retail sale.
The Kansas Supreme Court has said that the test should be
whether the goods are bought for resale "in substantially the
same condition" in which they were purchased.40 It make no
difference whether the purchaser uses or consumes the goods in
his place of business or in his home.4'1
Repair Men-It has been held in a leading case that a shoe
repairer does not "consume" the material in the form of soles
and heels which he places on worn shoes ;42 he resells such ma-
terial to the owner of the shoes. The court discounted the fact
that a custom existed among shoe-repairers not to make sepa-
rate charges for service and materials. As a consequence, the
sale of such material to the repairer was held not subject to
the tax.
The sale of parts and accessories to an automobile repair
shop operator who in turn sells them to automobile owners is
not a retail sale subject to the sales tax.43 But the contrary is
true if the operator consumes the materials in repairing or
reconditioning autos.4 4 If the vendee uses the materials in both
38. Atlas Supply Co. v. Maxwell (N. C. 1937) 194 S. E. 117; Albuquerque
Lumber Co. v. Bureau of Revenue (N. M. 1937) 75 P. (2d) 334.
39. Bradley Supply Co. v. Ames (1935) 359 Ill. 162, 194 N. E. 272.
40. Warren v. Fink (1937) 146 Kan. 716, 72 P. (2d) 968, where sales
of ice, wrapping paper, twine and paper bags were involved.
41. See 72 P. (2d) at 971.
42. Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission (1935) 87
Utah 227, 48 P. (2d) 526.
43. Cody v. State Tax Commission (Ala. 1937) 177 So. 146.
44. Ibid.
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ways, how can the vendor determine the amount of tax payable?
The Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that if the vendee is
engaged both in rendering repair service and in selling parts,
so that the goods are used indiscriminately for either purpose,
the entire sale is taxable.45 It makes no difference that the
vendee habitually resold a portion of the goods to others. No
tax is due, however, if the vendee operates only a retail store
and only occasionally uses parts for repair purposes. The vendor
must act in good faith and exercise due diligence to ascertain
"the usual course of business" of the vendee. If he so acts, he
cannot be held responsible if the vendde finally uses the mer-
chandise and does not resell it.451
The New York Court of Appeals has held taxable a sale of
chemicals to a dyer who processed furs owned by other per-
sons.4 6 The court had to reverse a lower court's decision 47 to the
effect that the dyer resold the chemicals in the form of micro-
scopic particles which adhered to the fur.
Contractors-The most vexing, the most important and per-
haps the most litigated problem which has arisen under the
sales tax involves the taxability of sales either by or to con-
tractors. As is to be expected, the courts have sharply divided
on this issue.
Some courts have held that the contractor actually sells tangi-
ble personal property to a customer.48 They hold that there is
a retail sale of brick, stone, lumber, concrete, and nails to the
person for whom the bridge, building, or highway is con-
structed.4 However, these courts will admit that the materials
and supplies become realty the moment the title becomes vested
in the owner.5 0  They contend that although the contractor
changes the form of the materials he does not "consume" them.51
He merely purchases for resale to the customer who is regarded
as the ultimate consumer. Such a viewpoint taxes not only the
45. Id. at 148.
45a. Ibid.
46. Menoza Fur Dyeing Works, Inc. v. Taylor (1936) 272 N. Y. 275,
5 N. E. (2d) 818.
47. Menoza Fur Dyeing Works, Inc. v. Taylor (1936) 247 App. Div.
368, 287 N. Y. S. 396.
48. Moore v. Pleasant Hasler Const. Co. (Ariz. 1937) 72 P. (2d) 673
(two steel bridges) subsequently overruled, infra, note 52; Wiseman v.
Gillioz (Ark. 1936) 96 S. W. (2d) 459 (dam, intake tower, filtration house);
R. S. Blome Co. v. Ames (1937) 365 I1. 456, 6 N. E. (2d) 841 (buildings)
also subsequently overruled, infra note 52.
49. Wiseman v. Gillioz, supra, note 48.
50. R. S. Blome Co. v. Ames, supra, note 48.
51. Moore v. Pleasant Hasler Const. Co., supra, note 48.
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sale but also reasoning and logic to the limit of their elasticity.
The majority of courts appear to have adopted the opposite
and more reasonable conclusion, namely, that of viewing the
contractor as the consumer.52 The sale of the materials to him
is thereby made taxable. These courts insist that the completed
structure, when erected on the customer's land, is as much real
property as the land itself.53 The contractor does not sell lumber,
lime, cement, etc. His undertaking is to deliver to his customer
some edifice, the construction of which requires the application
of skill and labor to the materials which in turn lose their
original character.5 '
The majority view is not only preferable from a common-
sense viewpoint but it recognizes the orthodox rule of Sales law
that in the performance of ordinary building contracts there is
no sale of the materials by the contractor to the owner of the
site, but "title to the material passes by accession as the mate-
rials in the process of construction become integral parts of the
building belonging to the owner of the site as part of his real
estate."55
Inasmuch as two state courts have within the past six months
reversed their original holdings in favor of the majority view,56
it would seem that the tendency is to regard the contractor
rather than his customer as the consumer.
The Alabama court has settled the problem in simple fashion.
It has held that the sale to the contractor and the transfer of
the structure to the customer are both taxable.57
52. Moore v. Pleasant Hasler Const. Co. (Ariz. 1937) 76 P. (2d) 225
(steel bridges). The court reversed its previous decision (72 P. (2d) 573)
on a technical point of statutory construction. It is submitted that the real
reason for the reversal was a realization of the erroneous holding in its
earlier decision. The court in the first decision relied a great deal on the
Illinois case of Blome Co. v. Ames (1937) 365 Ill. 456, 6 N. E. (2d) 841,
which had been reversed (infra this note) before this second decision was
rendered; Herlihy Mid-Continent Co. v. Nudelman (Ill. 1937) 12 N. E.
(2d) 638 (sewers and tunnels), expressly overruling the Blome case, supra,
note 51; State v. J. Watts Kearny & Sons (1934) 181 La. 554, 160 So.
77; State v. Christhilf (Md. 1936) 185 Atl. 456 (building for state univer-
sity and public roads); City of St. Louis v. Smith (Mo. 1937) P. H. State
& Local par. 23,016 (street, sewer, and hospital).
53. State v. Christhilf, supra, note 52.
54. State v. J. Watts Kearny & Sons, supra, note 52.
55. Vold, Law of Sales (1931) 13.
56. The Arizona and Illinois Supreme Courts have both reversed their
prior holdings, supra, note 52.
57. Lone Star Cement Corp. v. State Tax Commission (Ala. 1937) 175
So. 399, where the court held that the sale to the contractor was taxable,
but said that the resale would also be subject to the tax.
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3. IS THE VENDEE A TAXABLE PERSON?
Although the transaction may be truly a sale of tangible per-
sonal property at retail, the sale may still not be taxable if one
of the parties to the sale is a federal or state agency or a charity.
In this connection, it is important to scrutinize carefully the
particular state statute in question. It ordinarily contains ex-
press provisions on the subject. Problems have, however, arisen
in the absence of statutory provisions.
It should be borne in mind that the courts have quite gener-
ally held that the consumer or purchaser is the real taxpayer.,8
Although from a strict and technical standpoint the tax is levied
on the seller, he is merely a type of collection agent for the state.
This is especially true in those states where the statute makes
it unlawful for the seller to refuse to pass the tax on to the
purchaser.59
The federal government and its agents are of course exempt
even though not expressly exempted by the terms of the particu-
lar statute. 0 An interesting question, however, was raised as to
the taxability of sales to federal receivers operating businesses
within the taxing state. The problem has become largely aca-
demic since the enactment by Congress in 1934 of an act provid-
ing in substance that receivers and trustees in bankruptcy shall
be subject to the same taxes as private business.6' Thus a re-
ceiver operating a restaurant in Chicago has been held subject
to the Illinois Retail Occupations Tax. 12 He was therefore obliged
to add the sales tax to the price of food "sold" to patrons. This
would seem to be a fair treatment, for otherwise the receiver
would be given an unjust advantage over his solvent competitors.
A contrary holding would endanger the life of going concerns in
the hope of reviving a failing business. This form of commercial
blood transfusion is economically untenable. It is not surprising
that the courts permitted the taxing of receivers and trustees in
58. See by way of illustration but not by limitation: Bird & Jex Co. v.
Anderson Motor Co. (Utah 1937) 69 P. (2d) 510; School Dist. of K. C.
v. Smith (Mo. 1937) 111 S. W. (2d) 167; Long v. Roberts & Son (Ala.
1937) 176 So. 213.
59. See by way of illustration but not by limitation: Mo. Laws, 1937,
p. 558; 12 Mo. Stat. Ann. sec. 10164b-5; Alabama Acts, 1937, sec. 24.
60. Long v. Roberts (Ala. 1937) 176 So. 213, 218. This involves the ap-
plication of the old doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat.
316, 4 L. ed. 579, and Collector v. Day (1871) 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122.
See M. G. West Co. v. Johnson (Cal. 1937) 66 P. (2d) 1211, appeal dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction (1938) 58 S. Ct. 45, 82 L. ed. (adv. op.) 5
(sales to Federal Land Bank, Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Co-
operatives, and Production Credit Corp.).
61. (1934) 48 Stat. 993, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 124a.
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bankruptcy even prior to the enactment of the above-mentioned
statute.63 Perhaps a valid distinction could and should be drawn
between a sale by a receiver who is in the process of liquidating
a business and a sale made in the usual course of business by a
receiver who is operating a concern in an effort to rehabilitate it.
As to the applicability of the tax to state agencies, the courts
have reasoned from opposite directions, arriving at conflicting
results. Some courts have held that the failure to include the
state and its agencies among the specific statutory exemptions
indicates a legislative intent to tax sales to such units.4 It would
seem that the better view is expressed by those courts which hold
that state agencies are exempt even in the absence of statutory
provisions to that effect. They regard the exemption as resting
on principle rather than on statute.65 The argument of the Mis-
souri Supreme Court is that such taxation would be merely tak-
ing money out of one pocket and putting it in another.66 It is
possible that the unreported facts involved in the first group of
cases would reveal peculiar circumstances under which the state
would not have to pay the tax in any event-perhaps because the
sale was made under a fixed contract price which would necessi-
tate the absorption of the tax by the vendor.
The Michigan Supreme Court refused to authorize the levy
of the tax on a sale by municipally-owned public utilities. 67 It is
62. People ex rel. Ames v. Oppenheimer (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 85 F. (2d)
1002.
63. See People ex rel. Weber & Heilbroner, Inc. v. Graves (1936) 249
App. Div. 49, 291 N. Y. S. 354, motion for leave to appeal denied (1937)
273 N. Y. 681. The court refused to follow the holdings in In re Flatbush
Gum Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 283, and In re Browning King &
Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 983, where the federal courts inter-
preted the New York Sales Tax as not applying to receivers; see also In re
Leavy (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 25 (trustee in bankruptcy). The
Supreme Court of Utah held that a liquidating receiver appointed by the
state court was required to pay the tax since the tax is imposed on the sale
rather than on the seller as such. Bird & Jex Co. v. Anderson Motor Co.
(Utah 1937) 69 P. (2d) 510.
64. Moore v. Pleasant Hasler Const. Co. (Ariz. 1937) 72 P. (2d) 573;
Arkansas St. Hghwy. Comsn. v. Wiseman (Ark. 1936) 95 S. W. (2d) 557;
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission (1936) 177
Okl. 179, 58 P. (2d) 124. The Moore case was subsequently reversed on
another point, supra, note 52. The Arkansas court in Wiseman v. Gillioz
(Ark. 1936) 96 S. W. (2d) 459, held the transfer of a water system (dam,
intake tower, etc.) to a municipality taxable without considering the ques-
tion of the effect of the tax on the municipality.
65. Long v. Roberts & Son (Ala. 1937) 176 So. 213.
66. State ex rel. Mo. Portland Cement Co. v. Smith (Mo. 1936) 90 S. W.
(2d) 405, 408.
67. City of Wyandotte v. State Board of Tax Admin. (1936) 278 Mich.
47, 270 N. W. 211.
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submitted that a more sound result was reached by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, which held that sales by a municipality
were not exempt since the tax is imposed on the buyer and not
on the seller.68
As to the taxability of charities and educational institutions,
a great deal depends on the local statutes.68a Sales by charities
and educational institutions were held subject to the tax by the
Kentucky court although the statute granted specific exemption
to sales made to such bodies.,, The Supreme Court of Kansas
adopted what would seem to be a better approach by taxing
sales by educational institutions only when the proceeds were
not subsequently expended for educational purposes.70
One of the most perplexing features of sales taxes is their
relation to interstate commerce. The space limitations of this
Note preclude a discussion of this phase of the sales tax, which
has been ably treated in other recent legal periodicals.71
CONCLUSION
It would be impossible as well as misleading to conclude this
Note with a summary of general rules and principles applicable
to the sales tax cases. The cases are too conflicting and devoid
of general reasoning to permit of such an undertaking. A few
suggestions might, however, be made as to the proper approach
in ascertaining the applicability of the tax in any given situa-
tion. The first step should always consist of a careful examina-
tion of the express provisions in the sales tax statutes. If the
particular state statute does not cover the situation, a pragmatic
approach to the problem would seem advisable. Such an ap-
proach involves a thorough knowledge of the factual circum-
stances and the customs of the particular business or trade, a
surmise of the practical results which would follow from a levy
of the tax, an investigation into the manner in which the article
68. City of Covington v. State Tax Commission (1934) 257 Ky. 84, 77
S. W. (2d) 386. The Kentucky sales tax has since been repealed.
68a. Thus sales by or to the Y. M C. A. have been held exempt within
the provisions of the New York City Sales Tax law exempting receipts from
sales by or to "semipublic institutions" from the tax. Young Men's Christian
Ass'n v. City of New York (1935) 159 Misc. 539, 287 N. Y. S. 287.
69. City of Covington v. State Tax Commission (1934) 257 Ky. 84, 77
S. W. (2d) 386.
70. State Tax Commission v. Board of Education (Kan. 1937) 73 P.
(2d) 49.
71. Johnson, State Sales Taxes and the Commerce Clause (1936) 24 Cal.
L. Rev. 155; Warren & Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Com-
merce Pays its Way (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 49; Perkins, The Sales Tax and
Transactions in Interstate Commerce (1934) 12 N. C. L. Rev. 99.
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in question is used after it is transferred, and a consideration
of whether the "purchaser" intends to buy tangible personal
property or to receive certain services. It might not be amiss to
suggest that the financial status of the state's treasury might
conceivably influence the court in its adoption of a strict rather
than a liberal application of the tax.
Although there is still a great deal of conflict among the ex-
isting sales tax decisions and a tendency on the part of the courts
to develop their own unique law on the subject, a growing num-
ber of cases will soon produce a body of helpful precedent in the
field of sales tax law. But it would not seem advisable to rely
too strongly on precedent and analogy in other fields of law for
the very nature and purpose of the enactment of the sales tax
often compels the courts to disregard such precedent and analogy
and to adopt a different course of reasoning in order to give
effect to the basic principles of sales taxation.
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